No way to opt out of the renderer bridge — preload is injected into every session, with no sender validation on the IPC channel #175

We're integrating @datadog/electron-sdk (0.6.0) for main-process-only telemetry in an Electron shell that hosts both a trusted first-party web app and untrusted third-party pages in a sandboxed WebContentsView. Three interacting behaviors caused real problems:

1. The bridge preload is registered on every session, unconditionally.
instrument's patchBrowserWindow hooks app.on('session-created') and calls session.registerPreloadScript(...) on all sessions — including custom partitions deliberately created with no preload as a security boundary. There is no InitConfiguration option to disable this.

2. allowedWebViewHosts: [] does not disable the bridge.
The preload always adds the page's own hostname to the advertised allowed hosts:

const allowedHosts = [...new Set([location.hostname, ...configuredHosts])];

so every page is always bridge-eligible for itself, regardless of config.

3. The main-process handler does no sender validation.
ipcMain.on('datadog:bridge-send', ...) forwards any parsed message into the RUM intake without checking the sender's frame/origin/session.

Observed consequences:

• Our trusted window's page runs its own @datadog/browser-rum (separate RUM application). On detecting window.DatadogEventBridge, it silently diverted its events through the bridge, which re-tagged them with the Electron SDK's applicationId — corrupting attribution for our existing web RUM application (events were moved, not duplicated).
• Untrusted third-party pages in the sandboxed view received window.DatadogEventBridge and could inject arbitrary fabricated RUM events into our account via (3).

Workaround: after session creation, we strip the SDK's preload with session.getPreloadScripts() / unregisterPreloadScript() on every session. This works but relies on unspecified registration-timing behavior.

Requests:

1. An init/config option to disable renderer bridge injection entirely (main-process-only mode), or scope injection to sessions/partitions matching an allowlist.
2. Treat allowedWebViewHosts as authoritative in the preload — don't implicitly add location.hostname.
3. Validate the sender (e.g. event.senderFrame.origin against allowed hosts) in the datadog:bridge-send handler.

Happy to provide more detail. Environment: Electron 43.1.0, SDK 0.6.0, esbuild plugin, macOS.