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Fenrir Automated Review — PR #10203
Scan targets checked: wolfcrypt-api_misuse, wolfcrypt-bugs, wolfcrypt-compliance, wolfcrypt-concurrency, wolfcrypt-consttime, wolfcrypt-defaults, wolfcrypt-mutation, wolfcrypt-portability, wolfcrypt-proptest, wolfcrypt-src, wolfcrypt-zeroize
Findings: 5
5 finding(s) posted as inline comments (see file-level comments below)
This review was generated automatically by Fenrir. Findings are non-blocking.
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Jenkins retest this please |
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Also add missing ForceZero for ECDH shared secret on the heap.
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Jenkins retest this please |
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| /* free any buffers that may be allocated */ | ||
| if (pkcs7->stream->aad != NULL && pkcs7->stream->aadSz > 0) | ||
| ForceZero(pkcs7->stream->aad, pkcs7->stream->aadSz); |
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Since we are adding ForceZeros then we should put in wc_MemZero_Add calls in constructor.
If memory is dynamic then it will be checked in the free, otherwise you need a wc_MemZero_Check() in the destructor.
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| if (ret != 0) { | ||
| ForceZero(secret, secretSz); |
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Add a wc_MemZero_Add after malloc.
| * whether RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding was valid. */ | ||
| { | ||
| byte haveSrc = ctMaskGTE(realLen, 1); | ||
| uintptr_t srcVal = |
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Old compilers may not know unitptr_t.
| * instead of src[j] to avoid out-of-bounds | ||
| * access. The result is masked to zero by | ||
| * inBounds anyway. */ | ||
| word32 safeJ = j & (word32)(0x00U - (word32)( |
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The pattern I use is to increment safeJ if it doesn't take us out of bounds.
Same result but cleaner I think.
| * and real paths. Downstream decryption uses | ||
| * blockKeySz from the content algorithm, not this | ||
| * value, so the extra bytes are harmless. */ | ||
| *decryptedKeySz = (word32)sizeof(fakeKey); |
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This seems wrong.
Where does it hurt to use the real value?
| ForceZero(realPad, sizeof(realPad)); | ||
| } | ||
| ForceZero(fakeKey, sizeof(fakeKey)); | ||
| ForceZero(encryptedKey, (word32)encryptedKeySz); |
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Why ForceZero the encrypted key?
| wc_FreeRng(rng); | ||
| } | ||
| if (ret != 0) { | ||
| ForceZero(seed, sizeof(seed)); |
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seed doesn't contain anything at this point
4 participants
Fixes for various issues found in PKCS#7 code.
Fixes zd21593, F-2683, F-2684, F-2686, F-1552, F-1990, F-2681, F-2685, F-1991, F-1992, F-2679, F-2680. Also fixes a regression when building with
--enable-allandNO_PKCS7_STREAM.